THE HONOR OF GENERAL MCCHRYSTAL

Our fortunes in Iraq began to turn around when the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment ran a classic counterinsurgency operation in the town of Tal Afar, between Mosul and the Syrian border.

The nine month campaign begun in May of 2005 turned an al Qaeda stronghold into one of the most peaceful, pro-Western communities in Iraq.  It "will serve as a case study in classic counterinsurgency, the way it is supposed to be done," a retired intelligence officer told the Washington Post’s Tom Ricks.

And in fact it did serve as a blueprint for the strategy employed by Gen. David Petraeus throughout the country after the troop surge in 2007.

The 3rd ACR’s success in Tal Afar was a product of the brains and courage of its commander, then Colonel, now Brigadier General H.R. McMaster.

A decade before, Dr. McMaster (he also holds a Ph.D. in American history) had displayed brains and courage of a different sort with the publication of his book, "Dereliction of Duty."  

The thesis of the book (which was based on his doctoral dissertation) is that members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff knew President Lyndon Johnson and his Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, were pursuing a strategy in Vietnam based on domestic political concerns that was likely to lead to defeat, but none resigned in protest. 

All preferred keeping their jobs instead of their country’s honor and the welfare of their troops.

Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the man President Obama chose to command in Afghanistan, has made clear what he thinks is needed to turn around our deteriorating fortunes there.  But President Obama is reluctant to commit the resources necessary to implement the strategy he signed off on in March.  Gen. McChrystal may thus soon face the kind of test of character the Vietnam-era Joint Chiefs failed. 

Gen. McChrystal wants to implement a counterinsurgency strategy like that which worked in Iraq.  He says he needs up to 40,000 more troops to do it.  He sent an urgent request for them at the end of August, but the president has dithered.

Democrats fear if more troops are sent to Afghanistan, the war will divert attention and resources from President Obama’s domestic agenda, as the Vietnam war did from LBJ’s.  Vice President Joe Biden has proposed an alternative strategy in which most U.S. troops would be withdrawn.  Reliance would be placed instead on attacks on terrorist leaders by aircraft and drone missile strikes.

But Gen. McChrystal has said this won’t work.  And President Obama also fears the domestic political consequences of a withdrawal from Afghanistan, especially in light of all the things he said during the campaign about the importance of victory there.

Perhaps the worst thing Obama could do is "McChrystal lite," to formally endorse Gen. McChrystal’s strategy, but then to deny him the resources needed to make it work.

A story in the New York Times Tuesday (10/06) suggests this is the direction in which Mr. Obama is leaning.

"Meeting with leaders of both parties at the White House, Mr. Obama seemed to be searching for some sort of middle ground, saying he wanted to ‘dispense with the straw man argument that this is about either doubling down or leaving Afghanistan,’" wrote reporters Peter Baker and Jeff Zeleny.

"This is typical Obama pabulum," said Jennifer Rubin of Commentary magazine.  "Both sides are extreme and he, the voice of moderation, will step in to split the difference.  But this doesn’t work in a war when the middle ground, as we learned in both Afghanistan and Iraq, is not a viable option."

"This sort of willful obtuseness is deeply troubling because there simply isn’t any viable military/strategic rationale for what the president is straining to do," Ms. Rubin said.  "It’s a political approach plain and simple.  He wants money for health care, and he doesn’t want a revolt on the Left."

If President Obama opts for a strategy Gen. McChrystal thinks will lead to defeat, the general has a difficult decision to make.  As a serving officer, he must obey any lawful orders the president issues, even if they are stupid and dangerous.  And as a serving officer, he shouldn’t publicly criticize decisions the commander in chief makes.

But, as the Wall Street Journal said in an editorial, "no commander in uniform should ask his soldiers to die for a strategy he doesn’t think is winnable — or for a president who lets his advisers and party blame a general for their own lack of political nerve."

When Lyndon Johnson’s generals were faced with this quandary, they chose dishonor and did not resign.  Do not be surprised if General McChrystal makes the opposite choice.

Jack Kelly is a former Marine and Green Beret and a former deputy assistant secretary of the Air Force in the Reagan administration. He is national security writer for the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette.